Okay, guys, thanks for the feedback so far, but I have some more questions:
1. If the voice was clear, would cell-phone quality audio be acceptable (kind of "digital-sounding")?
2. Would it be useful to have an "CALL" or "ALERT" button that would "ping" the other stations in your encrypted comm net?
3. Would it be useful to be able to do encrypted messaging with the other members of your net by plugging the encryption module into the USB port of a laptop?
4. What kind of battery life is reasonable?
5. Do you think the USB-rechargable internal battery is a good idea, or should the thing run off something replaceable, like an "AA" cell?
6. Would it be useful to have button(s) to switch between two (or more) encryption key numbers, to allow for multiple nets or to "kill" compromised radios?
Your thoughts, please, survival mavens...
Great concept! I love the idea! Yes, proper commo training is needed to ensure security is not wasted, but alas, that's a training issue. SS is the way to go if possible as I believe RDF is under 2 sec. now.
Here's my take on your questions:
1. Cell quality is acceptable.
2. Call button pings are nice as long as noise discipline is maintained.
3. Encrypted messaging thru a laptop is cool. Encrypted messaging via a module to another module on another radio is cooler.
4. 1 common battery change per 24hr continuous stand-by period, and 12hr talk time is acceptable to me.
5. I like rechargeable battery packs (with no special stands) that can be pulled out & replaced by a caddy that holds regular AA batteries. My field solar rechargers laugh at the idea of special battery sizes & voltages.
6. Multiple encryption codes would add a nice versatility. Code reprogramming must be able to be performed without the need for a laptop. Perhaps a key module could also be made. An emergency zero key would be nice, but must be idiot-proof.
Even with encryption, I'd still use one-time pad brevity codes just to stay in practice.
I think some of the arguments mentioned above concern different perceived threats: (and are treated differently)
1. If the threat is an oppressive .gov (like China) that is in a pissy mood & is ready to squash anything that looks at it wrong, then end-users should know this and not use encryption if it might provoke genocide vs. it's innocent citizenry. In such cases, common phrase one-time pads are indicated.
2. If, on the other hand, the threats are gang-bangers trolling the civilian bands looking for easy targets in a crisis, then encryption is certainly the way to go. (provided #1 above is not also in play at that time)
Moral of the story? Know the threats arrayed against you, and secure your communications accordingly.